Is Warner Bros Sale To Netflix Or Paramount A Sign Of The Apocalypse For Hollywood Ecosystem? – Guest Column

Editors Note: The future ownership of Warner Bros has come down to a battle between Netflix and Paramount. If the government is looking out for the best interest of the entertainment industry, should either be allowed to close the deal? The resounding opinion in town is that, like when Disney swallowed Fox, there is little evidence that the quality of film will benefit, or the theatrical experience. We asked an expert, who makes the case that the concern is well warranted. Joseph M. Singer is a producer/film financier and former studio executive and the founder of Elixir Media. He is Managing Principal/CEO of a company that specializes in M&A; he has contributed as producer and financing consultant to most of the majors, negotiating four multiyear slate co-financing deals where Elixir bankrolled 25 to 33% of pictures and co-owns copyright. He assesses the potential damage ahead if Warner Bros is sold in the current iterations of the deals proposed by Netflix and Paramount.

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No major media company, not Netflix or Paramount, should be allowed to acquire Warner Bros Discovery.

Regulators should block the current attempts.

The Netflix proposal offers slightly more value than Paramount’s bigger offer. Offers by both sides are likely to increase, and it would come as no surprise if lawsuits are filed in Delaware in the next month.

Why Washington Regulators Must Block Any Sale Of Warner Bros Discovery

On paper, the proposals by Paramount Global and Netflix may appear to be routine corporate transactions, framed as inevitable responses to disruption.

They are not.

Any acquisition of WBD by one of these companies would cause measurable harm to competition, consumers, workers, regional economies, America’s trade balance, and U.S. cultural influence abroad. This is not about protecting one company. It is about preserving a competitive marketplace — and a democratic cultural ecosystem — from consolidation so severe it would echo across the economy for decades.

One Of The Last Irreplaceable Legacy Studios

Warner Bros Discovery is one of the last full-scale major studios, producing everything from theatrical films and TV, including kids’ animation, global franchises, sports, nonfiction, and exports content at an industrial scale. Remove WBD from the market, and the ecosystem contracts immediately.

A Paramount–WBD merger eliminates a major global buyer, distributor and creator overnight.

A Netflix–WBD merger would place HBO, Warner Bros, DC, Harry Potter, and a century of American film history under the control of the world’s dominant streaming platform.

The now stillborn Comcast–WBD merger would have re-created a vertically integrated distribution-content giant with power at every layer of the market.

In every case, competition shrinks. And when competition shrinks, consumers and creators lose.

There is an uncomfortable truth in this business that rarely gets said out loud: The company that controls distribution ultimately controls the market.

I’ve watched more films succeed or fail in the margins of distribution strategy than in development rooms. Greenlights matter. Budgets matter. But distribution — the ability to reach audiences at scale, on fair and open terms — is the oxygen of this industry. When a single company gains excessive leverage over theatrical booking, cable carriage, or streaming visibility, the system tilts. And once it tilts, it rarely tilts back.

If Netflix Buys WBD…

In this scenario, the algorithm becomes the distributor.

A horizontally dominant global platform — one that already sets the pace for streaming — would suddenly own an irreplaceable IP library. Competitors who rely on licensing Warner Bros films or HBO series would find themselves negotiating with a rival that controls both the licensing terms and the competing product.

That is not a fair fight. It collapses the licensing market, forecloses rivals, and concentrates discoverability power in a single algorithmic system that no regulator — and no creator — can meaningfully audit.

Importantly, there is no guarantee that Netflix will maintain the level of WBD theatrical distribution after the transaction closes, or that theatrical will continue at all after the current output and exhibitor deals expire — despite recent promises by Netflix’s Ted Sarandos to remain faithful to Warner Bros theatrical output. The video store manager-turned-streaming executive has already suggested that windows are too long and should be shorter. It is well known that Sarandos is a champion of the 17-day window versus a 45-day exclusive theatrical window that exhibition is championing. A 17-day window would collapse moviegoing altogether. In an earnings call earlier this fall, Sarandos said that even with the box office success of KPop Demon Hunters (the streamer’s first No. 1 ranking title at the domestic box office with $19 million), Netflix would remain true to its mandate of making first-rate films for the OTT service, not the big screen.

There is a material revenue difference, and it’s almost always negative when a studio moves a film to streaming at around 17 days and around 30 days, particularly on PVOD.

A Netflix-Warner Bros union would jeopardize the ancillary market windows’ revenue for theatrical for every company. Suddenly, Pay-1 deals would be worth less. PVOD, SVOD, and AVOD generate significant revenue for major studios and provide a financial floor for their product. Shorter windows would be a disaster for theatrical.

We already went from six major studios to five with the Disney acquisition of Fox; now we could go to four. This puts theatrical in jeopardy.

If Paramount Buys WBD…

The distortion would be quieter, but still profound and untenable.

Paramount already controls a major broadcast network, multiple cable brands, and a struggling streaming service. Absorbing WBD would consolidate much of the remaining linear and pay-TV ecosystem, leaving rivals — especially independents — with fewer and fewer pathways to reach audiences.

Paramount, absent a combination with WBD, would control a massive amount of theatrical content, which would be very harmful to the motion picture business. If the two studios merge, less product would exist, again severely damaging theatrical. Though David Ellison has vowed that a combined Paramount-Warner Bros would pump out 30 theatrical releases annually, potential conflicts with filmmakers are in store: How does one studio tell the director of a DC movie that a Top Gun movie is getting released the following weekend?

If Paramount gets WBD, fewer theatrical distribution outlets across all of the above would result in fewer chances to compete. And fewer chances to compete mean fewer reasons to innovate.

Distribution Determines Which Stories Win

Public debates about consolidation often fixate on content: who makes it, who buys it, who owns the IP. But the most crucial question — the one I learned to ask after watching dozens of films get choked off by bottlenecks — is simpler:

Will anyone be able to see it?

That is what consolidation threatens.

Not just the creation of films and television shows, but their discoverability. Competition does not only happen in writers’ rooms or greenlight meetings. It happens in release calendars. In exhibitor negotiations. In carriage talks. In homepage placement. In algorithmic prioritization.

A marketplace where one or two companies control the pipeline from production to viewer is not a marketplace at all. It is a controlled system. And controlled systems do not foster creativity. They protect incumbents, privilege what is safe, and punish what is new.

Distribution becomes a weapon rather than a marketplace.

Regulators must treat distribution power with the same seriousness as content ownership, because in modern Hollywood, they are inseparable.

Fewer Choices, Higher Prices, Less Innovation

Recent history offers a clear warning. Hollywood has run this experiment before. The Disney–Fox merger was approved with promises of efficiency and creative opportunity. What followed instead was predictable: fewer films, fewer jobs, shuttered labels, fewer risks on content, and a narrower range of stories making it to theaters. Consumers saw what economics predicted: higher prices. New and wide releases combined for Disney fell from 19 soon after the merger in 2019 to as little as nine titles last year.

A Paramount–Warner Bros merger would repeat that mistake on an even larger scale. Two of the remaining major theatrical studios would collapse into a single balance sheet. One slate would replace two. Capital allocation would become zero-sum rather than additive. Overlapping franchises, genres, and release calendars would be “rationalized” — a euphemism for cut.

If Paramount represents a classic consolidation problem, Netflix presents something more corrosive: an incentive mismatch that could quietly hollow out theatrical film altogether. Netflix’s business model is not built around box office success. It is built around subscriber retention, engagement hours, and global immediacy. Theatrical exclusivity — the foundation of the movie business for a century — actively conflicts with those incentives.

Yes, Netflix releases some films in theaters. But it typically has abbreviated windows, limited marketing, and little commitment to long-term theatrical growth. Under Netflix ownership, Warner Bros’ theatrical operation would not disappear overnight — but it may be downgraded, deprioritized, and eventually transformed into a marketing accessory for streaming.

That shift would train audiences to expect movies at home first, theaters second — an irreversible change in consumer behavior that no future studio could undo.

A WBD acquisition would repeat — and intensify — that pattern. One fewer major studio means fewer films made, fewer shows ordered, and fewer creative risks taken. Market concentration does not produce abundance; it produces scarcity.

The Job Losses Would Be Immediate And Nationwide

The Disney–Fox merger resulted in more than 5,000 direct layoffs and approximately twice that number of indirect jobs. A WBD merger with Paramount would likely eliminate 8,000-10,000 direct jobs, given overlap across corporate functions, cable networks, film, television, marketing, distribution, and streaming operations.

The damage would not be confined to Los Angeles. Production economies in Georgia, New Mexico, New York, Illinois, Louisiana and many other states depend on a competitive studio marketplace. When consolidation reduces output, it erases jobs across entire regional ecosystems — from soundstages and post-production houses to restaurants and small businesses.

Who Could Block The Merger

The Department of Justice, the FTC, Congress, State AGs, the EU Commission, the UK Competition and Markets Authority, and Canada’s Competition Bureau could open a full review if access to licenses or pricing is threatened. Other countries where WBD has significant operations, including Australia, South Korea, Germany, France, and India, can impose conditions or delay approvals. All of the aforementioned could prevent the merger.

The UK’s CMA is widely regarded as the world’s most aggressive merger regulator and has blocked more global deals than any single authority in recent years.

Production-heavy states that have invested billions in tax credits and infrastructure like Georgia, New Mexico, Louisiana, New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts rely on a diverse buyer ecosystem. Governors, film offices, and AGs could coordinate opposition based on harm to jobs, local vendors, and public investment.

Bottom Line

A Warner Bros Discovery acquisition is not a single federal decision. It is a multi-jurisdictional, global, and political process — with numerous actors empowered to delay, condition, or block the deal entirely.

Between federal regulators, state attorneys general, the EU, the UK’s CMA, labor unions, and foreign competition authorities, a Paramount- or a Netflix-led takeover would face a formidable gauntlet — not because mergers are unpopular, but because the public interest demands a competitive, diverse, and independent Hollywood.

A Direct Hit To America’s Trade Surplus And Soft Power

Film and television generate roughly $20 billion annually in U.S. trade surplus — one of the country’s most reliable export engines. That surplus exists because multiple studios compete globally.

Consolidation reduces output. Reduced output cuts exports. And shrinking exports open the door to foreign competitors who are eager to fill the void.

American soft power depends on plurality, not monopolies. A single gatekeeper deciding which stories travel the world is not cultural leadership — it is cultural bottlenecking.

The United States’ cultural influence had dominated the world. Studio films play theatrically in over 70 countries, then in knock-on markets for decades. Movies share our values, create markets for our non-film products, and are an invaluable asset to the U.S.

Keeping Warner Bros Independent

WBD doesn’t need another major media owner to survive. It needs to get simpler.

Keep Warner Bros Studios and HBO at the center. Split the decision-making, not the company. Fence off CNN and the cable networks. Keep selling non-core assets quietly and without drama. Work with the debt-holders; they don’t have a choice other than to be flexible, if the government does its job here. Use free cash flow to pay debt down, not to chase scale. License more aggressively, especially libraries, without giving up control. The point isn’t superficial growth; it is sustainable long-term flexibility, and strategic flexibility.

Theatrical itself is already self-selecting. Fewer releases. Clearer bets. Bigger moments. Fun event films still open. Horror still works well. Family films are the lifeblood of theatrical. The global box office remains the cheapest and fastest marketing engine in entertainment. Streaming didn’t kill theaters. It gave studios another high-margin place to sell or license the same film later.

In 2025, Disney, Universal, and Warner Bros all will finish with profitable theatrical years. The business isn’t dead; it adjusted. 2026 is the first “normal” year after two black swan events: Covid-19 and two labor shutdowns that closed Hollywood for 191 days. We’re about to see normalized results again. Universal, Sony, Disney, and Warner Bros all have strong slates. Paramount is in transition.

More studios need to become Rothman-esque. Show fiscal responsibility, protect windows. Take creative risks, but only where the math holds.

The Question For Regulators Is Simple

Does this merger benefit the public?

Across every metric — competition, prices, jobs, regional economies, trade balance, and cultural influence — the answer is no.

The Department of Justice, the FTC, and Congress should make clear now that any acquisition of Warner Bros Discovery by Paramount or Netflix fails the public-interest test and should not be approved.

This is not just an industry story.

It is a competition story.

A labor story.

A trade story.

And a story about who controls the United States’ cultural pipelines.

Washington and all regulators should hold the line.